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The past is a foreign country. Even the recent past is a foreign country. That is 
certainly true of the views of leading policymakers .The crisis that broke upon the world in 
August 2007and then morphed into a widening economic malaise in the high income 
countries and huge turmoil in the Eurozone, has put not just these countries but the world into 
a state previously unimagined even by intelligent and well-informed policymakers [Martin 
Wolf (2014)].  
The Global Financial Crisis led to re-appraisals of monetary policy strategies in many 
countries including New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Sweden, Norway and the United States. 
One aspect of these re-appraisals is the proper scope of a central bank’s mandate. Since the 
crisis central banks around the world have manifested a heightened sense of urgency for 
stabilizing the real economy.1 Accompanying this development is a growing unease about the 
appropriateness of inflation targeting as currently practiced.2 Most central banks target the 
CPI inflation rate in the belief that doing so constitutes “best practice” policy.3 Is this belief 
robust to a change in the emphasis toward output stability?  
Moreover, the crisis has underscored that a narrow focus on price stability does not 
guarantee financial stability. Indeed, Mishkin (2017, p.256) argues “price and output stability 
do not ensure financial stability.” A broad consensus has, however, emerged that financial 
stability is essential for macroeconomic stability.4 As a result, financial stability 
considerations now figure prominently in central bank communications and policy 
discussions. In small open economies where domestic firms do not adequately hedge their 
foreign exchange exposure, large exchange rate movements can seriously undermine the 
stability of the domestic financial sector.5 Recognizing this potential threat, Blanchard et al. 
                                                          
1 An amendment to the Reserve Bank Act in New Zealand in 2019, for example, added the goal of “supporting 
maximum sustainable employment” to its Policy Targets Agreement. For discussion of background to this 
change, see Orr (2019) and McDermott and Williams (2018). 
2 The relevance and suitability of CPI inflation targeting as a monetary policy strategy since the Global Financial 
Crisis is discussed in Is Inflation Targeting Dead? (2013). Various aspects of this issue with relevance to small 
open economies are discussed in Central Bank Frameworks: Evolution or Revolution?  [Simon and Sutton 
(2018)]. 
3 Svensson (2011) and Henderson and Faust (2004) discuss best-practice aspects of inflation targeting. The 
preference for a headline CPI target is not universal. The U.S. Federal Reserve targets the core personal 
consumption deflator.  
4 The Reserve Bank of Australia, whose monetary policy “Statement” recognized a dual mandate even before 
the financial crisis, included an “articulation of the financial stability objective” after the crisis [Debelle (2018; 
p.55)]. 
5 Mishkin (1999) emphasizes this point in the context of the Asian Financial Crisis. The lack of adequate hedging 
also became a problem in non-Euro member countries (or associate members) of the European Union during 
the Global Financial Crisis and the period thereafter. Domestic residents in these countries had borrowed 
extensively in Euros (or Swiss Francs) in the firm belief that the domestic currency peg (or stable exchange rate) 
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(2010) call for the mandate of central banks in small open economies to be expanded to 
include exchange rate stability as a policy goal.6,7  
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, central bankers in small open 
economies have had to operate in a more uncertain world environment. The major world 
economies are no longer in the stable period from the mid-1980s to 2007 that was termed the 
”Great Moderation”. The financial sectors of these economies are no longer in what Gorton 
(2012) called the “Quiet Period.” Small open economies are particularly vulnerable in this 
new macroeconomic environment. In the post-crisis period, their financial sectors have had to 
withstand a series of de-stabilizing shocks such as huge capital inflows and sudden stops 
caused by shifts in expectations about monetary policy in the United States and elsewhere, 
terms of trade shocks, and the break-up of goodwill in international trade relations.8 These 
massive disruptions have contributed to further undesirable increases in the volatility of 
exchange rates, which are a non-negligible source of instability in financial markets as 
pointed out above. 
This paper does not attempt a general re-evaluation of monetary policy strategies in 
the light of the Global Financial Crisis. Our focus is limited to two related issues both of 
which centre on the central bank’s mandate. The first issue is the relationship between the 
choice of an inflation objective and the relative emphasis on inflation versus real output in a 
small open economy model. We compare and contrast an alternative open-economy inflation 
objective, real-exchange-rate adjusted (REX) inflation, with a standard CPI inflation 
objective. Initially, the stabilization performance of each inflation targeting strategy is 
evaluated under a traditional narrow mandate of inflation and output gap stabilization – 
consistent with the Jackson Hole consensus. Next, and this brings us to the second issue, we 
consider a broader mandate which adds stability of the real exchange rate as a secondary goal 
for an optimizing central bank. How does this move to a broad mandate affect the relative 
                                                          
would be maintained. This proved fallacious. Foreign currency loans to households and non-financial 
corporations ranged from more than 80 percent of total loans outstanding in Latvia to about 30 percent in 
Poland (Financial Stability Review, ECB (2010)).  
6 Smets (2014) reviews the debate on the scope of a central bank’s mandate in a closed-economy context. A 
broader mandate for a central bank is proposed by advocates of both the “Leaning against the Wind” view 
Woodford (2012) and “Financial Stability is Price Stability view [Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014)]. 
7 Exchange rate stability is, of course, only one aspect of financial stability. We return to this issue in Section 2. 
8 See Pereira da Silva (2015) for an account of how both advanced and emerging countries have coped with the 
massive shifts in capital flows that have been triggered by unconventional policy measures in the United States, 
Europe, and Japan. A few advanced small open economies such as Australia and New Zealand were less 
affected by these policy developments abroad. In New Zealand, however, RBNZ repeatedly voiced its concern 
in 2014 about the unsustainable und unjustifiably high NZ dollar-US dollar exchange rate.   
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desirability of alternative inflation targets?9 What is the nexus between an increased emphasis 
on output stability and on financial stability, represented by real exchange rate stability, in 
determining the optimal flexible inflation targeting strategy? 
To address these issues we employ a small New Keynesian open economy model. We 
evaluate optimal policy under Woodford’s timeless perspective for a CPI and alternatively for 
a REX inflation target.10 The implications for macroeconomic stability of following each 
strategy are then analysed for different weights on inflation and output in the central bank loss 
function. Both a narrow mandate (traditional dual mandate) and a broad mandate (stability of 
the real exchange rate is an additional but secondary goal) are considered. 
The findings of this paper suggest that a REX inflation objective is the preferred 
choice for a central bank that values real output stability and is vested with a narrow mandate. 
Once stability of the real exchange rate becomes of some concern to the central bank the 
inherent advantage of a REX-inflation targeting strategy in stabilizing output diminishes 
though a sharp contrast still exists with CPI inflation targeting in terms of output versus 
inflation stabilization. The role that greater instability in the external environment plays in the 
choice of an inflation objective is shown also to be sensitive to the mandate of the central 
bank.  
2. A Monetary Policy Framework for a Small Open Economy 
Our analysis is carried out in a policy framework that consists of a small open-
economy model, a central bank loss function as well as alternative target rules for optimal 
policy under the timeless perspective. The model and loss function are described in this 
section. The derivation of the target rules is carried out in section 3. 
2.1 A Small Open Economy Model 
 The model employed for our evaluation of alternative inflation targeting strategies is a 
relatively standard New Keynesian open-economy model. One distinctive feature of the 
model is an open-economy Phillips Curve with a direct real exchange rate channel that stems 
from pressures on domestic firms from competitors in international markets. 
                                                          
9 In previous work Froyen and Guender (2017) evaluate the performance of CPI, domestic and REX inflation 
targeting under optimal discretionary policy. They don’t distinguish between a broad and a narrow central bank 
mandate. Froyen and Guender (2018) compare optimal policy under the timeless perspective with Taylor rules 
for both types of mandate. They consider only CPI and domestic inflation targeting. 
10 We also consider a domestic inflation target. Results with this specification are discussed at a later point.  
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 This specification of the Phillips Curve (equation 1) is an extension of the Rotemberg 
(1982) quadratic cost adjustment model of monopolistically competitive firms. In our open-
economy version, in addition to menu costs and a mark-up on benchmark prices of domestic 
competitors, firms take into consideration competitiveness abroad. Thus, they respond to 
exchange rate-induced changes in the terms of trade.11   
 Equation (2) is an open-economy IS relation with a real interest rate and a real 
exchange rate channel. A foreign output shock and an idiosyncratic shock also affect the 
demand for domestic output. The derivation of this form of the forward-looking IS relation is 
explained in Guender (2006). 
 Equation (3) is the linearized uncovered interest rate parity condition; apart from a 
stochastic risk premium (εt), agents are assumed to trade in a frictionless international bond 
market. Equation (4) sets out the relationship between CPI inflation and the real exchange rate 
under perfect exchange rate pass-through (4).12 
 t t t 1 t t t 1 t t 1 t tπ βE π κy b(q q ) βb(E q q ) u                 (1)
CPI f f
t t t 1 1 t t t 1 2 t t t 1 3 t t t 1 ty E y a (R E π ) a (q E q ) a ( y E y ) v             (2) 
t
f f
t t t 1 t t 1 t t 1 t tR E π R E π E q q ε              (3) 
 
CPI
t t tπ π γΔq      (4)
where     
t  the rate of domestic inflation, 
CPI
1ttE   the expected rate of CPI inflation,
tq  
the real 
exchange rate (with an increase in qt implying a real depreciation of the domestic currency), ty




nominal rate of interest, 
f
1ttE   the expected foreign rate of inflation, 
f
ty =  the foreign 
output gap. Lower case variables represent logarithms. All parameters are positive. The 
discount factor   is less than or equal to one. 
 We do not estimate the model. The model is calibrated using values taken from 
previous studies of small open economies. 
                                                          
11 Support for this responsiveness in provided by survey evidence for the United Kingdom in Greenslade and 
Parker (2012) and for New Zealand in Parker (2017). Additional support for the influence of exchange rate 
changes on price setting in the United Kingdom is provided by Bunn and Ellis (2012a, 2012b). For the derivation 
of the open-economy Phillips Curve see Froyen and Guender (2017). 
12 In equation (4) γ is the degree openness of the economy. Assuming uncovered interest rate parity and 




2.2 The Choice of a Central Bank Loss Function 
 The exercise we carry out is to evaluate the desirability of alternative flexible inflation 
targeting strategies for variations in the central bank loss function. The underlying reasons for 
changes in the loss function are motivated in the introduction. Before going into detail about 
our choice of a loss function, consider an example of motivation behind the change in one 
central bank’s framework. As noted in the introduction, in 2019 the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand added an explicit target of “supporting maximum sustainable employment.” Reserve 
Bank Governor Adrian Orr described the change in the Reserve Bank’s mandate as a response 
to an “evolving social contract” in a “national and cultural context.’—a context where the 
“dynamics of global and national economies are interacting to a greater extent and, at times, 
working at cross purposes.” 
 
2.2.1 The General Issue 
 The optimal monetary policy literature distinguishes two approaches to the choice of 
the loss function for the central bank. One emphasizes a welfare-theoretic approach; the 
central bank minimizes a loss function given by an approximation to a representative 
household’s utility function while the other is a “simple representation of conventional central 
bank objectives [Woodford (2011, p.728)].” The welfare theoretic approach has a strong 
claim in micro-based models. The approach also has its critics, e.g., Blanchard (2016), Sims 
(2012), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), to name but a few. We take no position on the 
general issue of which approach is preferable. We agree with Blanchard (2016) that one 
should take a pluralistic approach concerning the choice. To represent changes due to the 
broad type of forces such as Governor Orr describes, we adopt the simple representation of 
objectives. 
 
2.2.2 The Role of the Exchange Rate 
 There remains the question of what should be the central bank’s objectives? We 
consider the traditional dual mandate: an inflation target and the output gap, as well as a 
broader mandate that includes stability of the real exchange rate. 
 In the introduction we motivate concern for real exchange rate stability as an element 
in growing concern for financial stability. Kaefer (2014) lists as financial stability objectives: 
exchange rates, asset prices, leverage and interest rate spreads. In addition to being one of 
these objectives exchange rate stability is interconnected with the others. 
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 Blanchard et.al. (2010) argue that “[L]arge fluctuations in exchange rates, due to shifts 
in capital flows (as we saw during the crisis) or other factors, create large disruptions in 
activity… when a significant portion of domestic contracts is denominated in foreign currency 
(or is somehow linked to its movements), sharp depreciations can cause severe balance sheet 
effects with negative consequences for financial stability, and thus, output.” Kaefer (2014) 
makes a similar point and adds that “Capital inflows trigger credit and asset bubbles, which in 
turn generate the danger of a subsequent collapse (p. 166).” Rey (2016) emphasizes the 
existence of an international credit or risk-taking channel of monetary policy that works 
through the effects of changes in US monetary policy on exchange rates which in turn affect 
the net worth of domestic banks, and as pointed out in the introduction, the net worth of firms, 
and households. Domestic financial stability and economic activity clearly depend on the 
financial health of all three entities. Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) argue that a sharp real 
appreciation of the currency alongside increases in leverage is arguably a reliable indicator of 
financial instability. 
 Our choice to include exchange rate stability as a secondary stabilization objective 
accords with Smets’ (2014) view that price and output stability dominate financial stability as 
final objectives. In the literatures he reviews, Kaefer (2014, p.167) finds support for the view 
that “the weight given to that exchange rate should be considerably smaller than that given to 
inflation and output”.13,14  
 
3. Alternative Flexible Inflation Targeting Strategies 
 This section presents a brief analysis of the way central banks choose optimal policy 
under the alternative targeting strategies. We begin with a discussion of REX inflation 
targeting and then proceed to a discussion of CPI inflation targeting.  
 
3.1 Targeting “R(eal)-EX(change)-Rate-Adjusted” Inflation under Optimal Policy from a 
Timeless Perspective. 
 
                                                          
13  Ratcliffe and Kendall (2019) list “unnecessary instability” in interest rates or the exchange rate as among 
secondary policy objectives for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. 
14 There are additional rationales for inclusion of exchange rate stability in the central bank objective function. 
Blanchard et al. (2010) argue that appreciations in the real exchange rate “squeeze the tradeable sector.” This 
point was echoed by the Brazilian Finance Minister Mantaga “We’re in the midst of a currency war… This 
threatens us because it takes away our competitiveness.” Aizenman et.al. (2017) motivate exchange rate 
volatility in the central bank objective function via an effect on potential output. DePaoli (2009), within a 
framework with a utility-based loss function, motivates a role for the real exchange rate via a terms of trade 
externality. Within this framework, real exchange rate volatility may be either too low or high for optimality 
under the standard dual mandate (output and domestic inflation).  
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 REX inflation is defined as domestic inflation stripped of the effects of changes in the 
real exchange rate. Defining the inflation objective in this way transforms an open-economy 
Phillips curve into a closed-economy version. As a result, the exchange rate channel is 
effectively shut down and, abstracting from the expectations channel, the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism works solely through the output gap. A central bank targeting REX 
inflation in an open economy is thus in a position to stabilise perfectly the output gap against 
all demand-side disturbances, in exactly the same fashion as a central bank targeting inflation 
in the canonical closed-economy New Keynesian model can neutralize an aggregate demand 
shock. In case of an aggregate demand disturbance in the open economy, the central bank 
merely needs to determine the appropriate setting for the nominal interest rate that perfectly 
stabilizes the output gap and satisfies the UIP condition.  
 The REX inflation concept is related to Laurence Ball’s real-exchange-rate-adjusted 
measure in a backward-looking New Keynesian framework.15 Both measures are meant to 
represent core inflation objectives in open economies.  
Defining  
REX
t t t tπ π b(q q )   1         (5)  
as the rate of domestic inflation purged of the real exchange rate effect allows us to rewrite 
the original open-economy Phillips curve as 
REX REX
t t t t tπ βE π κy u  1         (6)  
Written in this form, equation (6) looks like a closed-economy Phillips curve except for the 
definition of the rate of inflation.  
 Under a REX inflation targeting strategy (and a zero inflation target), the central bank 










𝑖=0 ]   (7)
                 
         s. t. 
        
REX REX
t t t t tπ βE π κy u  1  
     and 
   
          f f f ft t t 1 1 t t t 1 t 1 2 t t 1 t 3 t t t 1 ty E y a (R E π ε ) (a (1 γ ) a )(E q q ) a ( y E y ) v
 
                                                          
15 Ball (1999) calls his real-exchange-rate-adjusted measure “long-run inflation.” It is defined as overall 
(domestic and imported) inflation purged of the effect of the lag (not the change) of the real exchange rate.  
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 The specification of the objective function of the central bank permits consideration of 
two scenarios under optimal policy from a timeless perspective. The first scenario describes a 
situation where the central bank has a broad mandate and is charged with pursuing price, 
output gap, and real exchange rate stability (µ,δ>0). The second scenario describes the case of 
a narrow or classic dual mandate where µ >0 but δ = 0. 
Solving the optimization problem yields the target rule under REX inflation targeting: 




Δ REXt t t
δ q
y μκπ




   (8)
  
Under a broad mandate where real exchange rate stability matters, the central bank trades off 
changes in real output for changes in the real exchange rate and the REX inflation rate 
(changes in the REX price level). Notice that this trade-off depends on demand-side 
parameters (a1 and a2 ), the degree of openness (γ ), and the emphasis on real exchange rate 
stability (δ) in addition to the standard parameters µ and κ.16 The former parameters determine 
the relative importance of the real exchange rate in the target rule and hence its stability 
overall. If the central bank has a narrow dual mandate, then δ = 0 and the target rule reduces 
to an expression similar to the canonical closed-economy target rule: 
         (9)  
In this case the central bank trades off changes in real output for changes in the level of the 
real-exchange-rate-price level (REX inflation rate) only. The implementation of optimal 
policy has no regard for instability of “rates” other than the REX inflation rate. 
 
3.2 Targeting the Rate of CPI Inflation under Optimal Policy from a Timeless Perspective 
 
 If the focus of the central bank rests on the CPI inflation rate, then it minimizes  
   
i 2 CPI 2 2
t t i t i t i
i 0




     (10)
 
 
subject to the constraint which is represented by the model economy. After rewriting the 





t t i t i t i
y ,π ,q
i




  2 2 2
0  
s. t.           (11) 
                                                          
16 Both a1 and a2 depend on the degree of openness γ. See Guender (2006) or Svensson (2000). 




t t t 1 t t t 1 t t 1 tπ βE π κy (1 β )( γ b)q ( γ b)q β( γ b)E q u              
and 
f f f f
t t t 1 1 t t t 1 t 1 2 t t 1 t 3 t t t 1 ty E y a (R E π ε ) (a (1 γ ) a )(E q q ) a ( y E y ) v               
 
The target rule for a CPI inflation targeting strategy under optimal policy proves complex, 
defies easy interpretation, and is therefore not reported.17  
 The variances of the endogenous variables under both targeting strategies are 
determined by numerical solution and reported in the next section. 
 
4. REX vs. CPI Inflation Targeting under a Narrow and Broad Mandate 
  
 
  In this section we evaluate the performance of CPI versus REX inflation targeting for 
different weights on the policy objectives, different mandates for the central bank and in 
alternative macroeconomic environments. The metric we use is the variance of the 
macroeconomic variables in our small open economy model for each configuration. We also 
compute a loss score which is the value of the loss functions in section three for each flexible 
inflation targeting strategy. The parameters used in these calculations as well as the 
assumptions made about stochastic terms in the model are given in a footnote to Table 1.
  
 As a point of departure, let us consider first what we regard as a conventional view of 
inflation targeting prior to the Global Financial Crisis. A central bank chooses (or is 
delegated) a measure of inflation as its price stability objective and stabilizes the level of real 
output around its full-employment level. The overriding objective of the central bank is to 
ensure price stability with some concern given to keeping output fluctuations in check, a 
strategy commonly referred to as flexible inflation targeting. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 
present the outcomes of two embodiments of flexible inflation targeting, one centred on the 
rate of CPI inflation and the other on REX inflation. (We return to columns 3 and 4 in section 
4.3.) We represent the strong emphasis on stabilizing the rate of inflation by choosing a value 
(μ =8) in the loss function. Given this strong emphasis on price stability, the central bank is 
                                                          
17 A straightforward Interpretation of the CPI inflation target rule is made impossible by the presence of 
undetermined coefficients. These coefficients are instrumental in determining the effect of the state variable, 
the lagged real exchange rate, on the forward-looking expectations of the three choice variables. In addition, 
the weights on the target variables cannot be signed unambiguously in all cases. One clear result that emerges 
is that history-dependence matters more compared to REX inflation targeting as do parameters that 
characterize the demand-side of the economy.   
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far more likely to choose the CPI inflation rate as its preferred inflation objective. A CPI 
inflation objective makes for greater stability of both rates of inflation (particularly CPI 
inflation at 0.04), the real exchange rate, and the policy instrument. The only advantage of 
REX inflation targeting is its superior ability to stabilize the output gap. 
 
  As explained in the introduction, in the wake of the worst financial crisis since the 
Great Depression, the narrow focus on price stability as a final objective is no longer taken for 
granted. Two planks of the pre-crisis  view have been challenged.  First, critics have argued 
that central banks’ overriding concern with price stability is not sufficient for maintaining 
financial stability. In a small open economy the real exchange rate is a barometer of the health 
of the domestic financial sector and the competitiveness of the domestic economy on the 
world stage. As such the real exchange rate should be a secondary final objective in an 
expanded inflation targeting strategy. Second, the emphasis on keeping inflation low and 
stable relative to the output gap should be reconsidered.  
 The reconsideration of inflation targeting frameworks raises an important question. 
Would a central bank that takes both points of criticism seriously  reverse its decision to 
choose the rate of CPI inflation as its inflation objective? To answer this question, we make 
two changes to the existing framework. First, the relative weight on inflation variability is 
reduced from µ = 8 to µ = 1 for both CPI and REX inflation targeting strategies. Second, we 
distinguish between a narrow and a broad central bank mandate.  
 For equal weights on the rate of inflation and the output gap in the objective function, 
the variances of the endogenous variables under optimal policy for CPI and REX inflation 
targeting strategies appear in Table 2. The results for both strategies are arranged according to 
mandate and examined in subsections 4.1 and 4.2. 
  
4.1 A Narrow Mandate 
 Columns 1 and 3 of Table 2 show the variances of the five variables for a REX and 
CPI inflation target, respectively, under a narrow mandate. A stark contrast emerges between 
REX inflation and CPI inflation targeting with the former strategy keeping fluctuations in the 
output gap to a bare minimum (0.04) while the latter strategy provides greater stability of all 
“rates”.18  
                                                          
18 This assessment of course rests to some extent on the specific values chosen for the parameters of the 
model and the variances of the shocks. In their study of the performance of inflation targeting strategies, 
Froyen and Guender (2017) carry out multiple robustness checks without overturning any of their reported 
findings. In section 4.3 we report further on the robustness issue. 
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  Under a REX inflation target, stabilizing the output gap also stabilizes REX inflation 
to a degree as the real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve is not operative. Thus, when 
vested with a narrow mandate, the central bank simply does what it takes to shield output 
from demand-side disturbances without worrying about the consequences for the variability 
of the policy instrument and the real exchange rate. Operationally, this implies that the central 
bank adjusts the policy instrument so that in equation (9) the output gap does not change, 
requiring no compensating change in REX inflation. In contrast, under a CPI inflation target, 
the central bank cannot afford to use the policy instrument as aggressively, as doing so would 
cause large changes in the real exchange rate that in turn would destabilize the CPI inflation 
rate (as happens with REX inflation targeting). As the central bank uses the policy instrument 
more cautiously under CPI inflation targeting, it does not reverse the effects of demand-side 
shocks on output to the same extent as under REX inflation targeting. This advantage of REX 
inflation targeting over CPI inflation targeting in stabilizing the output gap is borne out by the 
entries in the first row of Table 2. The variance of the output gap under a CPI target is almost 
16 times the size of same under a REX inflation target. A central bank that values relative 
output stability (µ = 1) under a dual mandate has a far greater incentive to choose a REX 
inflation target than a central bank with an overarching concern for relative price stability (µ 
= 8).  
 
4.2 A Broad Mandate 
  Once the central bank puts even a modest weight on exchange rate stability, 
adjustment of the policy instrument with a consequent effect on the real exchange rate is no 
longer costless under a REX inflation target. Therefore, the central bank uses the policy 
instrument less aggressively; the variability of the nominal interest rate falls by 60 percent. 
This has costs as well as benefits. For a REX inflation target (entries in column 2), the cost is 
that demand-side disturbances now affect the output gap and hence flow through to REX 
inflation. There is a seven-fold increase in the variance of the output gap from 0.04 to 0.29. 
The benefit is that the variance of the real exchange rate falls to about a third of its value 
under the narrow mandate. The broader mandate also helps bring down the variance of CPI 
inflation by nearly 50 percent. 
 Column 4 describes what happens to the variability of the key variables under a CPI 
inflation target as the central bank’s mandate broadens. Adopting a broader mandate leads to 
relatively moderate increases or decreases in the variability of all variables except for the real 
exchange rate and CPI inflation. With a broader mandate, a CPI inflation targeting strategy 
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becomes even more restrained. The central bank exercises greater caution in using its policy 
instrument so as to reduce the variance of the real exchange rate further (by nearly 50 
percent). Targeted CPI inflation is unchanged.  
 A sharp contrast still remains between CPI and REX inflation targeting under a broad 
mandate. Under CPI inflation targeting the variance of CPI inflation is less than half the value 
under REX inflation targeting while the variance of the output gap is more than twice as 
high.19 
  
4.3 Changing the Macroeconomic Environment: Greater Aggregate Demand Uncertainty 
 One important issue that has not been addressed so far in our analysis concerns the 
role of macroeconomic shocks in a central bank’s choice of an inflation targeting strategy. 
Michael Woodford, a key figure in the development of inflation targeting, has written that the 
strategy was “expected to eliminate  a particular source of macroeconomic instability, namely, 
the possibility of wage-price spirals triggered by commodity price shocks of the kind that had 
been problematic in the 1970s (2012, p.7).” As pointed out in the introduction, in the post-
financial crisis era small open economies are exposed to several other important sources of 
instability. In this sub-section we assess to what extent differences in the volatility of demand-
side relative to cost-push shocks affect the performance of targeting strategies in the pre-crisis 
and post-crisis environment. 
 There are five different shocks in the model. Four of them are considered to be 
demand-side disturbances (v, Rf, ε, yf ). We now increase the size of the variances of these 
shocks from 1 to 4 while leaving the variance of the cost-push shock unchanged. The change 
is meant to capture the recognition by policymakers in small open economies of greater 
instability in the world economy.  Motivation for a link between this change in the variability 
of shocks facing policymakers and their choice of an inflation targeting strategy is tied to our 
earlier observation that REX inflation targeting under a narrow mandate fully stabilizes the 
output gaps and inflation objective against demand-side shocks while CPI inflation targeting 
due to the role of the exchange rate in the CPI cannot do so. Greater instability of aggregate 
demand should thus make ceteris paribus REX inflation targeting a more attractive monetary 
policy strategy. 
                                                          
19 A third strategy to consider is domestic inflation targeting. Under a narrow mandate, its stabilization 
performance lies between that of REX and CPI inflation targeting but closer to the former. A broader mandate 
causes further convergence between the performance of domestic and REX inflation targeting. Domestic 
inflation targeting is slightly better at stabilizing “rates” while REX inflation targeting retains a modest edge in 
stabilizing the output gap.  
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 The third and fourth columns of Table 1 show the variances of the variables of the 
model economy in the pre-crisis state after the four-fold increase in the size of the variances 
of the demand-side shocks. There is of course no change in REX inflation or output gap 
variability under REX inflation targeting, but there are substantial costs associated with 
following this core inflation strategy. These costs fall squarely on the remaining variables of 
the model. The variances of CPI inflation, the policy instrument, and the real exchange rate 
shoot up in dramatic fashion. The variances of all variables increase under CPI inflation 
targeting with output gap variability now being topped only by the variability of the policy 
instrument. CPI inflation variability, though doubling, remains low 
 Turning attention to Table 3 which describes the post-crisis scenario and assumes 
higher volatility of aggregate demand disturbances, we see that a clear pattern emerges in the 
behaviour of the macroeconomic variables.20 Going from left to right, i.e. from a narrow 
mandate and REX inflation targeting to a broad mandate and CPI inflation targeting strategy, 
we observe  
- a steady and pronounced increase in the variance of the output gap and very little 
change in the variance of the REX inflation rate. 
- steady and pronounced decreases in the variance of the CPI inflation rate, the policy 
instrument, and the real exchange rate.  
REX inflation targeting maintains its superiority over CPI inflation targeting in stabilizing the 
output gap while CPI inflation targeting continues to dominate from the viewpoint of 
stabilizing the rate of CPI inflation, the nominal interest rate, and the real exchange rate. 
  
 5. Conclusion 
 This paper shows that the behaviour of key macroeconomic variables is heavily 
influenced by the choice of the inflation targeting strategy, the mandate of the central bank, 
and its relative concern for price stability. An optimizing central bank with a narrow mandate 
and equal concern for price and output stability can ensure a relatively high degree of real 
output stability under REX inflation targeting. A broader mandate erodes the appeal of REX 
inflation targeting. While CPI inflation targeting cannot match the output-stabilizing record of 
REX inflation targeting, it is better poised to limit fluctuations in all rates of inflation, the real 
exchange rate, and the policy instrument. Under a broad mandate and equal concern for price 
                                                          
20 Such a pattern, albeit less clear, is also visible in Table 2. 
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and output stability, the stark contrast between CPI and REX inflation targeting in stabilizing 
the output gap and all “rates” diminishes but does not go away.  
 
Carolyn Wilkins, Senior Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada, stated in a speech 
entitled “ Choosing the Best Monetary Policy Framework for Canada,” that “even a well-
functioning monetary policy framework deserves an open-minded discussion, particularly in 
the post-crisis world we live in” (Wilkins (2018)). Such a discussion in a CPI inflation 
targeting country as it confronted the changes discussed here would find forces pushing in 
opposite directions. Were the only change to be an increased emphasis on output stability, our 
analysis suggests that a move to REX inflation targeting might be attractive. But given 
increased concern with financial stability, the advantages of CPI targeting in stabilizing all 
“rates” is a counterbalancing factor. While the model here has its limitations and we consider 
only a subset of the relevant issues, the analysis is consistent with the result that many such 
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Table 1: The Performance of Flexible Inflation Targeting (IT) Strategies: Measures of 

















1. Slight differences exist between computed loss scores and individual variances due to 
rounding error. 
2.  Demand shocks include all shocks of the model except for the cost-push shock in the Phillips 
curve.  
3. The following parameters are used in calculating the variances of the endogenous variables 
(based largely on Svensson (2000) and Guender (2006)): 






are mean zero disturbances with a standard deviation set at unity unless stated otherwise. All 






















σ2 = 4  for  
demand 
shocks 
V(y) 0.85 2.03 0.85 5.09 
V(πREX) 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.66 
V(πCPI) 1.90 0.04 7.36 0.08 
V(R) 5.04 2.04 20.01 7.36 
V(q) 8.97 4.16 26.01 4.92 




















V(y) 0.04 0.29 0.63 0.72 
V(πREX) 0.86 0.90 0.80 0.85 
V(πCPI) 2.55 1.35 0.62 0.62 
V(R) 5.01 2.01 1.76 1.62 
V(q) 5.85 1.90 2.31 1.18 





1. Hereafter we assume that the policymaker is concerned in equal measure about output gap and 
inflation variability. 
2. Under a broad mandate, real exchange rate stability is a secondary policy goal with its relative 
weight measuring one fifth the size of the relative weight on inflation stability (δ=0.2µ).  
3. To avoid inflating the variances of the variables under a broad mandate, we scale the 
preference parameters so that their sum equals 2 under both mandates. Thus, if the relative 
weight on real exchange rate stability is one fifth the relative weight on inflation stability, then 




Table 3: The Performance of Alternative Inflation Targeting (IT) Strategies for Larger 
















V(y) 0.04 1.12 1.88 2.58 
V(πREX) 0.86 0.91 0.80 0.86 
V(πCPI) 8.00 2.93 1.48 1.06 
V(R) 19.99 8.01 6.39 6.04 
V(q) 22.90 7.39 6.72 3.46 
Loss 0.91 3.19 3.37 3.94 
 
 
 
